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It was less than a week after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that the then 
Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), William 
O’Neil, noted that international terrorism represented a threat to the maritime 
industry. Speaking at a conference on safety in maritime transport, O’Neil 
commented that, “in the longer term, it is clear that security measures surrounding all 
forms of transport will have to be re-examined and re-assessed in the light of this 
tragedy. We are all potential targets of terrorist activity” (O’Neil, 2001).i[1] A little 
under three years later, on 1 July 2004, this re-examination and re-assessment was 
most clearly illustrated when the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code came in to force. Developed within the IMO and introducedinternationally for 
added consistency, the ISPS Code encapsulated a new maritime security regime. To 
name just two examples, it required the appointment of Port Facility Security Officers 
(PFSO) tasked, amongst other things, with co-ordinating port security surveys and 
developing port security plans; while it also required the introduction of restricted 
zones within ports.  
  
The ISPS Code was the international community’s most prominent regulatory 
response to concerns that terrorists might attack ships and ports and/or exploit them 
to facilitate attacks elsewhere.ii[2] Today it sits alongside various other mechanisms 
designed to secure the maritime domain against a series of presented security 
threats;iii[3]  threats such as piracy, terrorism and drugs trafficking. These threats have 
increasingly been laid out in formal maritime security strategies such as that of the 
African Union (AU) in January 2014, the United Kingdom (UK) in May 2014, and 
the European Union (EU) in June 2014.iv[4]  
  
As maritime security considerations rise up both the political and security agendas 
with prominent challenges such as piracy increasingly capturing attention, this article 
sheds further light on how we might think about resultant security practice. It does 
this through an elaboration of how one part of the maritime domain – ports - and in 
one major island state and global maritime power - the United Kingdom - was 
securitised in the specific context of responses to international terrorism, the ‘war on 
terror’. This process results in the development of a typology of counter-terrorism 
practice, a typology which offers a mechanism for examining port security. Ports are 
an important case study as they have a multi-faceted role representing nodes in the 
global supply chain, hubs in the transport network and as border management 
locations. As such what happens in and around them in terms of security practice has 
a significant bearing on economic development and has the potential to spark varied 
political debate.  
  
Taking the date onwhich the ISPS Code came in to force internationally, 1 July 2004, 
and drawing upon developments in the years immediately thereafter, the article 
demonstrates the way in which activities associated with UK ports were influenced 
by wider concerns about the threat that international terrorism posed to what a 
number of leading western political leaders would refer to as the ‘civilised way of 
life’v[5]. Examples of counter-terrorism practice associated with UK ports are 
discussed, with the totality of this practice understood to encapsulate three broad 
constituent parts – ‘legislation and regulations’, ‘institutional developments and 
infrastructure changes’ and ‘working practices’.vi[6]  
  
Structurally the article starts by contextualising the environment in which counter-
terrorism practice in UK ports was implemented drawing upon the Copenhagen 
School’s work on securitisation. It argues that the securitisation of UK ports in the 
context of responses to international terrorism was wrapped up in a mutually 
reinforcing relationship with the macrosecuritisation of the ‘civilised way of life’, 
captured in the ‘war on terror’ discourse. It was in this context that a particular set of 
narratives emerged about the threat posed by international terrorism to UK ports, 
narratives that ultimately underpinned the case for, and created the space in which, 
the counter-terrorism security response in relation to ports was implemented. Despite 
the reference to narratives however, the article does not seek to offer an additional 
discourse analysis of the ‘war on terror’, of which there are many (see Silberstein 
2004, Jackson 2005, Croft 2006). Rather the discussion of narratives is included to 
illustrate the backdrop against which counter-terrorism practice was implemented in 
UK ports. 
  
With this process complete the article moves to its core task of laying out its typology 
by discussing examples of legislation and regulations, institutional developments and 
infrastructure changes, alongside working practices witnessed in the years after the 
ISPS Code’s introduction. Three overarching objectives underpinning counter-
terrorism practice are noted: (1) ensuring security readiness by preparing for all 
eventualities, (2) protecting the port from the terrorist threat, and (3) putting in place 
mechanisms to verify security compliance and standards. While the focus of the 
article is on counter-terrorism practice in UK ports, the multi-levelled governance 
associated with UK port security is evident as the involvement of actors at the 
international (IMO), regional (European Union) and national (UK) levels is 
discussed, and the influence of the United States noted. This multi-
levelledgovernance is perhaps unsurprising when we consider the global nature of the 
maritime industry, the existence of the European single market, and the relative 
openness of UK ports to private ownership, each where regulatory harmonisation is 
deemed to aid business. Nevertheless, it illustrates the way in which ports serve as an 
example of the blurring of state sovereignty as varied non-state actors exercise 
influence over activities within a state’s territorial boundaries.  
  
The article concludes by utilising the typology to elaborate how, in the case of the 
UK at least, the counter-terrorism security response in relation to ports could be 
described as constantly evolving, layered and increasingly expansive in scope. A 
spatial dimension to the securitisation of UK ports in this particular context is thus 
noted as being present alongside a temporal dimension, as authority figures sought 
ever greater knowledge about, and as such control over, activities associated with 
these sites. The end result is that alongside providing a mechanism through which 
counter-terrorism practice associated with ports can be organised and examined, the 
article also illustrates how an emphasis on the management of space is a core 
consideration when conceptualising port security. While more generally the article 
also contributes towards efforts to more clearly map and conceptualise maritime 
security (Bueger 2015) by illustrating the way in which security practice within the 
shore component of the maritime domain – ports – was justified and practices 
institutionalised. 
  
The macrosecuritisation of the ‘civilised way of life’ 
Before laying out a typology of counter-terrorism practice in UK ports in the context 
of responses to international terrorism, it is first necessary to better understand the 
backdrop against which such practice became possible, and was implemented; in 
short the policy environment. This approach rests on a starting assumption that 
discourses have practical policy implications (Campbell 1998, Jackson 2005, Croft 
2006, Hansen 2006). More specifically, to do this the work of the Copenhagen 
School, specifically its securitisation theory, is particularly useful. Through 
securitisation theory the Copenhagen School seek to explain and understand what 
security is, how it is constructed, and provide answers to the following questions: 
“who can ‘do security’, on what issues, under what conditions – and with what 
effects?” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 27). A securitising actor identifies an 
existential threat to a particular referent object and in doing so frames the issue 
“either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde 1998, 24) so that emergency measures can be pursued.  
  
This speech act represents an acknowledgement that under certain conditions simply 
by uttering words, something is done – like betting, making a promise or naming a 
ship (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 26).vii[7] This securitising move is only 
successful if an audience ‘accepts’ the need for emergency measures, creating an 
environment in which ordinary liberal-democratic rules can be and are revoked, 
suspended and/or circumnavigated; in doing so changing the relationship between 
securitising actor, referent object and audience in some way. Security then is “a self-
referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security 
issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is 
presented as such a threat” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 24). Thus 
securitisation is about framing an issue in such a way that it becomes generally 
accepted that it is of the utmost priority, that implementing a response is a necessity, 
because a failure to act risks the demise of a particular referent object.  
  
In 2009 Buzan and Waever introduced the concept of ‘macrosecuritisation’ to their 
work. They examined the possibility that securitisations can be maintained between 
the middle level of analysis where “collective political units, often but not always 
states, construct relationships of amity and enmity with each other” and the system 
level of analysis (Buzan and Waever 2009, 253). They also acknowledged how “one 
over-arching conflict” can result in a “higher order of securitisation” becoming 
embedded with other “more parochial securitisations beneath it” (Buzan and Waever 
2009, 253). Moreover, in examining the relationship between securitisations, Buzan 
and Waever (2009, 254) also highlighted the concept of ‘security constellations’ 
which they acknowledged had been originally under-developed.  A security 
constellation encapsulates “the totality of possible security interrelationships at all 
levels” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 201) and the focus on them is designed 
to serve as an acknowledgement that securitisations are not isolated (Buzan and 
Waever 2009, 257).  
  
The concept of macrosecuritisation and the associated emphasis on security 
constellations further developed securitisation theory by serving as a formal 
acknowledgement of the way in which different securitisations can influence each 
other. By focusing on the evolution of securitisations, an element of process is 
introduced to the theory giving it added dynamism. Moreover through the study of 
macrosecuritisations a mechanism is provided through which analysts can examine 
how particular meta-narratives can frame and dominate the policy environment. This 
emphasis on meta-narratives effectively captures how in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, both foreign and domestic policy was 
increasingly framed by responses to international terrorism.viii[8] 
  
Ultimately the ‘war on terror’ counter-terrorism discourse captured a 
macrosecuritisation. Here a macro-level referent object, the ‘civilised way of life’ 
(encapsulating liberal-democracy, individual liberty and economic prosperity) was 
presented as being existentially threatened by a macro-level threat, ‘international 
terrorism’.ix[9] The events of 11 September 2001 were understood as a point of no 
return and subsequently emergency action was presented and accepted as a necessity, 
an inevitable response to the threat posed, it was a matter of survival. With this came 
a sense that constant vigilance and no complacency with regards to the presented 
threat were essential if that threat was to be tackled and the referent object secured. If 
western political leaders internationally, most prominently in the US and UK, were 
the securitising actors making the presentation of an existential threat, then their 
audience was made up of the national policy networks specifically constructed with 
the responsibility for the counter-terrorism security response, and the general public 
to whom governments must appeal for support for their decisions.x[10]  
  
The macrosecuritisation became institutionalised in the immediate aftermath of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, as the reiteration of the need to undertake a ‘war’ 
and references to terrorism were themselves increasingly understood as references to 
the presented existential threat to the ‘civilised way of life’.xi[11] A further 
demonstration of the influence the terrorist attacks had was evident in the common 
reference to ‘9/11’. It was symbolic of the way in which the attacks were 
memorialised and inextricably linked with the ‘war on terror’.xii[12] This is the 
backdrop against which counter-terrorism developments in UK ports can beseen. 
  
The port as potential target and vulnerable space 
With the policy environment set out, attention can now return to the port, which this 
article argues, can be understood as a ‘site of securitisation’.xiii[13] This description 
stems from an acknowledgement that ports are ultimately geographic spaces in which 
buildings and equipment (assets) can be located and a series of activities take place. 
The idea that a geographic space where everyone, everything, and all activities 
associated with it, can be increasingly positioned as requiring ‘securing’ against 
presented threats with the associated policy implications, is effectively captured by 
Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan in their work on outer space. Here for 
example they note how “the deployment of technologies with the aim to secure, 
safeguard, defend, and control certain assets, innovations and activities in space is 
presented to us as an inevitable and necessary development” (Bormann and Sheehan 
2009, 2).  
  
The emphasis on the inevitability and necessity of security practice is important to 
reiterate as it reminds us that such practice emerges from, and ultimately feeds, 
securitisation. From the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, through 
to the date the ISPS Code came in to force on 1 July 2004, and across subsequent 
years, two main threat narratives, not always easily differentiated from each other, 
were evident in relation to ports. The first narrative presented the port as possible 
‘target’ of international terrorism. International terrorism threatened the operability of 
the infrastructure which in turn had wider negative ramifications. The second 
presented the port as a ‘vulnerable node’, a space that could be exploited by terrorists 
to do harm elsewhere. These narratives created the space in which, the rationale even, 
for the development and implementation of the counter-terrorism security response 
associated with UK ports.  
  
To illustrate further, the contours of these two narratives can be seen in speeches 
made by two different Secretary-General’s of the IMO, a specialised agency of the 
United Nations responsible for developing and maintaining a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for shipping, and out of which the ISPS Code emerged. At a 
speech to the IMO in December 2002, IMO Secretary-General William O’Neil 
connectedthe presented threat of terrorism to the maritime industry as considerations 
about a regulatory response were emerging. Reproducing the target narrative he 
commented: 
“…I have been taking every opportunity to raise the awareness of the 
importance and significance of shipping to world trade and the economic 
chaos that would be caused if the global supply chain were to be 
interrupted because of terrorist attacks against ships, ports, offshore 
terminals or other marine facilities” (International Maritime Organization 
2002a, 3). 
  
Nearly two years later, as preparations were being made for the ISPS Code to come 
into force on 1 July 2004, the importance of responding to the presented terrorist 
threat and the idea that there should be constant vigilance and no complacency with 
regards to it were still being reiterated. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 
Madrid in March 2004 the new IMO Secretary-General Efthimios Mitropoulos, who 
took office in November 2003, reiterated the threat deemed to be posed by 
international terrorism captured in both main narratives, emphasising that: 
While the 1st July deadline constitutes a pact among Governments doing 
business in a civilized manner under the mutually binding provisions of a 
treaty instrument, this deadline means nothing to terrorists who may decide 
to strike wherever and whenever such an act might suit their evil purposes 
– and, have no doubt, they will do so if they assess that are defences are 
low or, to put it in a different manner, when they think that our defences 
are not high enough to prevent and deter them from committing any 
atrocities they may have in mind to commit against our industry, the 
international trade and world economy (International Maritime 
Organization 2004a). 
  
As a final reminder the IMO also published statistics every five days during June 
2004 showing the percentage of ships and port facilities which had had their security 
certificates/plans approved.xiv[14] 
  
A typology of counter-terrorismpractice in UK ports 
Attention now turns towards examining the counter-terrorism security response in 
more detail in relation to UK ports, providing a snapshot of what securitisation 
looked like on a day-to-day basis. The counter-terrorism security response can, to 
draw a little more directly on the terminology of the Copenhagen School, be 
understood as encapsulating the content of emergency measures, their delivery and 
impact on day-to-day activities. To provide additional structure to this process of 
shedding light on the securitised environment and to more effectively facilitate the 
process of highlighting trends, it is here that the formulation of a typology of counter-
terrorism practice in UK ports is useful. This typology should be understood as a 
flexible, living framework that aspires to provide a useful starting point for analysts 
whether they are interested in port security, practical responses to international 
terrorism, or security practice as a whole. Towards the end of article reassembly takes 
places as wider conclusions are drawn about UK port security in the context of 
responses to international terrorism. 
  
As a starting point of the typology the totality of counter-terrorism practice witnessed 
in relation to UK ports can be sub-divided, albeit with some overlap, in to three broad 
constituent parts. The first part - ‘legislation and regulations’ – includes those 
documents laid down in law which introduced or framed particular emergency 
measures relating to UK ports. The second part - ‘institutional developments and 
infrastructure changes’ – often, though not always, emerged as a result of the 
requirements laid down in new legislation and regulations. Institutional developments 
are understood as those changes in the institutional structures that are put in place to 
implement emergency measures. Representing then the way in which members of the 
policy network are organised, attention is placed on charting the creation and 
operation of new agencies, working groups and committees, to name three examples. 
Infrastructure changes on the other hand encapsulate those material changes deemed 
to be necessary to secure UK ports. This includes physical changes within ports 
themselves, through say, the construction of new fencing, and the development and 
use of new technologies to maintain security procedures. The third part - ‘working 
practices’ – includes those day-to-day practices undertaken by members of the policy 
network, many of which emerged as a result of the other components. One such set of 
working practices are those security training programmes undertaken by those 
working within UK ports.  
  
A: Legislation and Regulations 
Turning to ‘Legislation and Regulations’, to contextualise developments in the post-1 
July 2004 period it is important to provide more information on the ISPS Code itself. 
The Code provides a framework made up of two parts and 38 sections (excluding 
annexes) through which both vessels and port facilities at the ship-port interface can 
be secured.xv[15]  The code was implemented through the adoption of amendments to a 
re-identified Chapter XI-1, ‘Special measures to enhance maritime safety’ and the 
addition of a new Chapter XI-2 titled ‘Special measures to enhance maritime 
security’, to the central maritime treaty the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS, 1974). The code “applies to passenger ships and cargo ships of 
500 gross tonnage and upwards, including high speed craft, mobile offshore drilling 
units and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages” (IMO 
n.d). 
  
The code is split in to two parts, the first is mandatory and the second is 
recommendatory.  Within Part A there is, for example, a requirement to introduce a 
maritime security regime whereby the ship/port interface becomes a restricted area 
where access is increasingly controlled and activities more heavily monitored. 
Alongside this, the code requires the introduction of Ship and Port Security Plans 
(SSP’s/PSP’s), a Ship Security Officer (SSO), Company Security Officer (CSO) and 
Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) with responsibility for their management. The 
code introduces a process of certification for both ships and ports to ensure 
compliance which is managed by the state where the relevant port is located or ship 
registered. Three different security levels are also introduced which enable the level 
of threat to be constantly monitored and the appropriate responses to be initiated. The 
code also demands that all security decisions made are recorded in some detail, and 
that the required training, drills and exercises are undertaken to ensure familiarity 
with the plans (IMO 2003, 6-36).  Part B of the code provides a little more detail and 
contains advice on how to most effectively comply with those mandatory 
requirements in Part A. For example, regulation 4.2 states that a contracting 
government to the IMO (a member state) may identify “a Designated Authority 
within government to undertake their security duties relating to port facilities as set 
out in chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code” (IMO 2003, 43) Within the United 
Kingdom, responsibilities are split between the Department of Transport (DfT) and 
the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). 
  
While the ISPS Code was the clearest manifestation of the securitisation of UK ports 
in the context of responses to international terrorism, it did not stand alone. Two 
notable developments were evident with regards to ‘Legislation and Regulations’ in 
the years after 1 July 2004. The first was a general emphasis on information-
gathering about the activities taking place on a day-to-day basis within UK ports. 
Considering the container port by way of illustration, one regulatory move pursued 
by the European Union was to introduce a 24-hour manifest rule for containers. If the 
ISPS Code through its restricted zones helped facilitate the monitoring of the physical 
ship/port interface; such a manifest rule would strengthen pre-screening of the cargo 
moving through that interface by collecting and sharing data on the cargo within 
containers bound for an EU port at least a day before loading commenced in the non-
EU port. The rule was an example of the EU’s emphasis on maintaining an 
intelligence-led approach to container security, an approach some in the US Congress 
at the time challenged as they instead sought 100% container scanning.xvi[16] The 
manifest rule became mandatory across the EU on 1 January 2011, a delay of nearly 
18 months on the initial target of July 2009, as the appropriate institutional structures 
and infrastructure were put in place across the union.xvii[17] 
  
Alongside the general emphasis on utilising legislation and regulations as a 
mechanism through which information-gathering about activities associated with 
ports could take place; a second notable characteristic of UK port security was the 
multi-levelled auditing and inspection regime that was implemented. If the former 
development illustrated a desire to locate potential challenges to UK port security that 
required a response, the latter was an effort to ensure compliance, encourage 
improvements of security standards and seek greater harmonisation of such standards 
within and between countries of those security measures that were already in place. In 
short, there was a desire to ensure ports went beyond simply approaching security as 
a paper exercise.  
  
The idea of inspecting ISPS Code implementation for example had been around as 
the Code was first developed, but as the in-force date (1 July 2004) had drawn ever 
closer, focus increasingly turned towards setting out the mechanics of such a 
programme. While it had been decided that external inspections for UK ports were to 
be undertaken by a combination of European Union (EU), Department of Transport 
(DfT), and Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) inspectors; the specific nature 
of the EU’s role had been the subject of debate at the European level. There was a 
dividing line between the Council of Ministers who sought merely a limited screening 
role for EU Inspectors, checking documents without any need for physical presence 
in ports, and the European Parliament and Commission that sought a far more 
substantial and active role (Stares 2005, 1). For the industry itself, concerns centred 
on the logistical strains that could accompany multiple inspections, as Patrick 
Verhoeven of the European Sea Ports Organisation commented: 
we do not mind commissioninspectors if they help to ensure a level playing 
field, but we are concerned about having a multitude of inspectors which 
could lead to a situation where you have an inspector from the commission 
one day, from the member state the next day and from the US the following 
day (Stares 2005, 1).xviii[18]  
  
The disagreements serve as a reminder of the multi-levelled governance of UK port 
security, blurring our traditional understanding of sovereignty. They also illustrate 
that tensions can arise between different actors along the policy chain as each seeks to 
defend and advance their own interests. Eventually the system that was negotiated 
edged more towards that sought by the European Parliament and Commission. 
Member state inspection teams gained primary responsibility for assessing 
compliance and standards within their territory, yet European inspectors were to 
undertake more than a ‘screening role’ as they were empowered to visit member state 
ports and go aboard European registered vessels themselves. The specific purpose of 
European inspections was “to verify the effectiveness of national quality control 
systems and maritime security measures, procedures and structures” (European 
Commission 2004). The specific EU inspection procedures were laid down in 
‘European Commission regulation 884/2005’ published on 10 June 2005 (European 
Commission 2005).  
  
B: Institutional Structures and Infrastructure Developments 
Shifting attention to the changes in institutional structures and infrastructure 
developments witnessed in UK ports in the years after 1 July 2004, the desire to gain 
information about and more effectively monitor activities within ports is evident once 
more. There was considerable investment in protective security measures in UK 
ports as Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) was introduced or upgraded and identity 
card technology embraced. This all sat alongside the construction of new and 
enhanced fencing and access gates to delineate between what were restricted areas 
and what were not, evidence of an interest in influencing behaviour alongside 
monitoring it. These changes were undoubtedly the most visible sign of securitisation 
for any outsider looking in. None were wholly new developments, but the pressures 
imposed by measures such as the ISPS Code to place security considerations at the 
centre of day-to-day activities ultimately led to higher quality infrastructure being 
installed across the board in the form of stronger fencing and more powerful 
cameras.xix[19]  
  
This imposed a significant additional cost to port operators. At the Port of Felixstowe 
for example, approximately £1 million of new fencing alone was purchased and 
erected in the run up to 1 July 2004. The costs would be met, partially at least, by the 
introduction of security charges to shipping companies. The UK’s long-standing 
‘user-pays’ principle in port security meant there was little to no financial support 
provided from central government. In future years Felixstowe would also be at the 
forefront of the investment in new technology, developing an IDentification and 
Access Control System (IDACS) to aid in the monitoring of both cargo and people 
and in 2006 an identification system for those road hauliers using the port called the 
Road Haulier IDEntification System (RHIDES) which utilised an ID card with 
biometrics.xx[20] The utilisation of biometrics, even though this was not a national 
requirement, was defended on the grounds of pursuing a greater level of security. The 
port introduced a ‘no card; no container’ policy from 1 March 2007 and in following 
years further increased its demands on hauliers. One example was its decision not to 
allow ‘orphan’ hauliers (those not linked to a recognised company) to utilise the port.  
  
The introduction of technology as advanced as RHIDES is a reminder that the 
security practices undertaken in and around UK ports did in part depend on the scale 
of operations in a port and the ability and willingness of port operators to meet costs. 
As one interviewee acknowledged to the author, while other ports took security 
seriously “there is a limit to what they can actually do, whilst trying to maintain a 
business” (Author’s Interview). Nevertheless another interviewee noted that a balance 
could be struck between security and operational requirements arguing that, “…If you 
can make your supply chain more secure, it improves operations. If you can make 
your operations better then generally it will improve security. If the operation is 
slicker there is less chance anyone doing anything bad to it” (Author’s Interview).   
  
The policy network responsible for implementing the counter-terrorism security 
response on a day-to-day basis also set up a variety of institutional structures to 
facilitate implementation. Port security committees met on an approximate monthly 
basis in major ports with a membership including representatives from central 
government (mainly from  the Department for Transport), Special Branch (SB) ports 
officers, local Home Office force representatives, ports police and senior port 
management. Sometimes change in institutional structures came about more from 
compulsion than anything else. Emerging out of European directive EC 2005/65, 
adopted by the European Council and Parliament in October 2005 (European Union 
2005), was the requirement for Member states to designate a port security authority 
for every major port that was to be responsible for identifying and taking the 
necessary port security measures in line with port security assessments and plans 
(European Union 2005, paragraph 10). With regards to those port security 
assessments, the directive noted that “areas will be judged not only upon their direct 
profile as a potential target, but also upon their potential role of passage when 
neighbouring areas are targeted” (European Union 2005, Annex I),xxi[21] representing 
a direct example of the reproduction of the two main threat narratives highlighted 
earlier within official regulatory documents. Member states had to comply with the 
directive by 15 June 2007 (European Union 2005, Article 18, 1). 
  
In the UK, this process was by no means smooth as a view was held by both 
regulators and the industry that the requirements set out in the directive had already 
been largely met. For example, the demands that security assessments and plans were 
reviewed at least once every five years, and that annual basic training covered 
“communication, coordination, resource availability and response” (European Union 
2005, Article 10,1 and Annex III), were already in place and on occasion had already 
been exceeded. UK authorities argued that the existence of port security committees 
represented compliance as their activities were what the directive envisaged for port 
security authorities. Yet the EU disagreed seeking to ensure such institutional 
structures were established and governed on a statutory basis. At one point the UK 
was even threatened with legal action for non-compliance (Butcher 2009, 10).xxii[22] 
Eventually, in 2009, the UK introduced secondary legislation transposing 
thedirective’s requirements in to UK law and set about creating port authorities 
(United Kingdom Parliament 2009).  
  
There were also efforts to more effectively pool resources and to share best practice. 
The launch of the Police National Maritime Security Strategy (PNMSS) introduced 
additional structures designed to enhance co-ordination not just between the police 
but between a range of members of the policy network responsible for the security of 
UK ports. Developed and monitored by the National Co-ordinator Ports Policing 
(NCPP),xxiii[23] and emerging out of the PROTECT strand of the UK government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), the PNMSS recommended “a systematic 
approach to portal security” ensuring “the consistent protection of portal regions 
across the UK”, by encouraging a “joined-up partnership approach making effective 
use of current enforcement agency and partner resources” (All from: Douglass in 
Shahbazian, Rogova and de Weert 2009, 33). Each portal region was required to 
develop its own management structures in order to discuss and co-ordinate the 
delivery of the strategy. The most common format was for senior representatives 
from SB, Home Office police forces, immigration, customs and the coastguard in 
particular to meet face-to-face on a periodic basis. Others, including representatives 
from the National Association of British Ports and port managers attended dependent 
on the meeting agenda and/or the security level of those topics under discussion.  
  
The borders of each region were the subject of considerable debate in the years after 
1 July 2004. These debates were fuelled by a series of factors including historical 
alliances between various police forces, considerations of police force size and threat 
perception. Looking at East Anglia, concerns were, for example, expressed over the 
initial separation of Norfolk and Suffolk in to different portal regions, a situation that 
was later rectified when the former was brought in to the Thames and Dover portal 
region with the latter. There was also a view advanced that the Metropolitan Police 
was so large and had to deal with threats of a sufficiently different nature and 
magnitude in comparison to neighbouring forces that it made efforts to enhance co-
ordination here inherently more complex. The PNMSS also emphasised the need to 
identify vulnerable sites and installations in a region for protection, recommended the 
creation of Regional Maritime Information and Intelligence Teams (ReMIIT) and the 
launch of Regional Maritime Response Teams (ReMRT) to name just three examples 
(Douglass in Shahbazian, Rogova and de Weert 2009).  
  
C: Working Practices 
While legislation and regulations with an emphasis on port security proliferated, new 
institutional structures emerged, and investments in additional infrastructure took 
place; the working practices of those operating in and around ports changed too. The 
threat narratives that facilitated the counter-terrorism security response witnessed in 
relation to UK ports were particularly evident in efforts to build security awareness 
in and around ports amongst staff and visitors alike. To some extent the expectation 
held by port managers was that security awareness would simply grow as a result of 
individuals being exposed to security requirements such as showing identification at 
certain designated points. Yet a more proactive role was also taken to ensure the 
existing response was further institutionalised and increasingly became second 
nature. References to security were visible throughout the ports studied, below is one 
example of a sign at one port visited.  
  
Figure 1 – Security level signxxiv[24] 
  
The sign itself is one requirement of the ISPS Code. ‘Security Level 1’ is a reference 
to one of the three levels of security - in essence states of readiness – also introduced 
by the ISPS Code. This level determines the nature of security activities undertaken, 
such as the minimum percentage of port users who should be searched. The DfT sets 
the relevant security level for UK ports after discussions with relevant parties. The 
sign is particularly interesting because although level 1 represents the lowest required 
state of readiness, the sign nevertheless serves a constant reminder to staff that 
‘security’ is something they have to be aware of, that they should always be alert for 
possible changes. Its prominent position outside the office of the Harbour Master, 
who serves as PFSO - the management centre for the port – is also a mechanism 
through which the port owners and management can illustrate the way in which they 
take security seriously. Finally the addition of a padlock preventingunauthorised 
changes to the security level, serves to emphasise further that the security level is 
deemed to be of such importance that it should not be tampered with or changed 
lightly and that there are consequences to any change. 
  
Port managers were also aware of the particular demands in relation to 
implementation created by their specific environment. Beyond signage a range of 
security awareness posters were placed in prominent positions to inform staff and 
users of particularly relevant legislation/regulations and the need for constant 
vigilance. Such practices again illustrate how implementation did not simply take 
place in one-off events but rather was continual and had multiple stages. The Port of 
Felixstowe designed posters encapsulating a new port motto – ‘Serious about 
Security’ - which included a direct line telephone number for concerns to be reported. 
Like the security sign, the use of a motto, that also was included in some of the port’s 
correspondence, both reminded staff and users to be aware of security and served a 
public relations role showing outside parties that as a port Felixstowe took its wider 
security responsibilities seriously.  
Figure 2 – Port security posterxxv[25] 
  
This poster was one of those developed and displayed in the port. By utilising images 
to advance awareness, it serves as a reminder of how the presented threat drawn upon 
in the two main narratives could also be reproduced visually. The language included 
on the poster served as an important mechanism to give the image wider meaning, the 
image itself provided an insight in to the way in which managers sought to emphasise 
that security was everyone’s responsibility by using the drawing of an ordinary port 
worker as Felixstowe’s representative. For added clarity the tagline reminded staff of 
their responsibilities, the inclusion of the dubious looking individual skulking away 
from the scene reiterated the sense of an ‘Us Vs Them’ dichotomy associated with the 
macrosecuritisation and captured in the ‘war on terror’ discourse, the departure from 
a ‘private area’ emphasised a distinction between open and closed space, while the 
use of the one word ‘Suspicious’ with the affixed question mark provided an 
additional reminder that an inquisitive mind was what was sought.  
  
For both security staff and port users regular searches, specifically of vehicles, were 
one of the clearest manifestations of the securitisation of UK ports and an additional 
mechanism that security awareness was built. Conducting searches of vehicles 
coming from ferries in to the UK at Holyhead for example was predominantly the job 
of privately contracted security personnel who were tasked with looking for 
suspicious items. Across the ports visited great emphasis was placed on ensuring 
security staff were well prepared for their duties through the use of training and 
drills. As one port manager explained, his objective was to ensure that individuals 
knew that “security is not just for Christmas; it is here to stay” (Author’s Interview).  
  
Part B of the ISPS Code had suggested that some form of drills should take place 
every three months to “ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the 
port facility security plan” (International Maritime Organization 2003, 98, paragraph 
18.4). In one UK port this served as just the start as the private port police force 
conducted a minimum of eight drills per year. As a senior officer explained “I am a 
great believer you should train hard and fight easy” (Author’s Interview). This 
explanation illustrated how more militaristic language – where the friend/enemy 
distinction is a central feature – filtered through in to the mentality with which some 
port working practices were approached. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were, 
for example, also utilised by the NCPP, with SB ports officers submitting information 
on a regular basis against these KPIs to the NCPP for auditing. The use of KPI’s was 
by no means unique to ports policing, being a common practice across the maritime 
industry as a whole. One port manager was required by his superiors to submit 

















Figure 3 – Typology of counter-terrorism practicexxvi[26] 
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Emerging out of the empirical research undertaken, a typology of counter-terrorism 
practice is laid out helping to facilitate the highlighting of key characteristics and 
trends. The figure illustrates the way in which the ‘war on terror’ shaped the policy 
environment in which the different components of the counter-terrorism security 
response for UK ports became possible. At the operational level three main objectives 
being pursued by the policy network responsible for the counter-terrorism security 
response in UK ports can be located. First, those efforts to build awareness around the 
nature of the threat international terrorism was presented as posing and to ensure 
security readiness through training, were about preparing for all eventualities. 
Second, those measures pursued to strengthen the very fabric of the port and enhance 
awareness of activities taking place in and around it, such as the installation of 
fencing and CCTV, were about protecting the port from the terrorist threat. Third, the 
focus on compliance with legislation and regulations and the harmonisation of 
standards, encapsulated the desire to check the response was working and improving 
and rested on the understanding of the need for continual vigilance and no 
complacency with regards to the presented terrorist threat. To summarise even 
further, each of these three objectives can be captured in a single word - ‘Prepare’, 
‘Protect’ and ‘Verify’ respectively. 
  
Those measures discussed in this article and included in Figure 3 represent a snapshot 
of the totality of measures that could be witnessed, and of course all are underpinned 
by the need to finance their implementation on a day-to-day basis. What was also 
evident in UK ports during this period, and is captured in the absence of dividing 
lines between the various measures in Figure 3, was that there was substantial overlap 
and mutually reinforcing relationships in play between the different objectives 
pursued and measures implemented to secure UK ports. Whilst CCTV cameras for 
example do serve a protective function flagging up potential active threats to the 
integrity of a port and its restricted zones, they also facilitate a checking function 
allowing the port to assess the behaviour of its personnel. The positioning of the 
policy network down the right side of the figure is designed to illustrate the multi-
levelled governance in relation to UK port security evident, governance involving a 
range of state and non-state actors. The structure of the ISPS Code inspection regime 
or the EU’s demand for statutory port authorities illustrate this clearly, reminding us 
once more that ports are part of a truly global maritime industry. 
   
What is also clear is that not every security measure discussed in this article was 
initiated and designed with counter-terrorism exclusively in mind. The tri-partite role 
ports play asnodes in the global supply chain, hubs in the transport network, and as 
border management locations, ensured ports were rarely untouched by broader say, 
border security developments. Nevertheless the backdrop of the ‘war on terror’ cast a 
long shadow. The ISPS Code was a clear manifestation of this situation, a regulatory 
response pursued in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, shaping practice 
internationally. Furthermore, the roll out of inspection regimes, the creation of portal 
regions and the use of KPI’s, also illustrates the rather mundane character of many 
measures implemented in UK ports.  
  
Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the scale of change witnessed in UK ports 
in the years after 11 September 2001. It is very difficult to imagine such a counter-
terrorism security response emerging without the backdrop of the ‘war on terror’; the 
boundaries of what was regarded as necessary had clearly shifted. This situation 
reminds us that while a typology of practice can help us deconstruct the counter-
terrorism security response to locate trends, re-aggregation to look at the complete 
whole is still required.  
                      
Conclusion: The spatial dimension to the securitisation of UK ports 
With this re-aggregation in mind, three main characteristics of the counter-terrorism 
security response relating to UK ports can be highlighted. First, the counter-terrorism 
security response constantly evolved. The implementation of emergency measures 
was a continual and multi-stage process, but one not immune to the difficulties 
associated with the implementation of policy. Alterations to the membership of 
regional portal groups created to deliver the PNMSS, was just one small illustration 
of how different actor interests led to concrete change. The evolution of the counter-
terrorism security response was captured most clearly in those efforts to ensure the 
response was further institutionalised. If we understand institutionalisation as the 
process of embedding particular activities, roles, even ideas in day-to-day operations 
so as they become like second nature, it was pursued prominently here via efforts to 
ensure universal compliance with emergency measures and the harmonisation and 
improvement of security standards. This institutionalisation had placed attention on 
enhancing security awareness and expanding security training seen with regards to 
the ISPS Code after 1 July 2004 for example. 
  
Second, the counter-terrorism security response was layered. This characteristic 
primarily emerged out a desire to ensure that if one element of the response failed to 
secure UK ports, another would be in place to tackle the presented terrorist threat. For 
example, while restricted zones around the port/ship interface could be seen, amongst 
other things, as being able to help prevent an attack on a ship whiledocked or prevent 
terrorists from gaining access to the entire port, other measures were taken here too. 
The EU designed 24-hr container manifest scheme for example would enable shore 
authorities to gain information on prospective vessels and cargos in advance of 
departure, allowing them to deny access to those around which there were concerns. 
The response was also layered in a more generic sense. If the security level in relation 
to UK ports varied so the security practices undertaken would vary. Moreover 
practice was shaped by a mixture of measures, some of which were developed with 
ports firmly as their focal point, some of which were more associative in that they 
focused on the wider supply chain, transport network and UK border, while general 
counter-terrorism and civil contingency legislation could also have an impact. The 
response was also layered in the way in which emergency measures were initiated at 
different levels of governance. 
  
Third and finally the counter-terrorism security response was increasingly expansive 
in scope. This was evident in two main ways. On the one hand this expansive scope 
was captured in the way in which counter-terrorism considerations influenced a 
growing range of day-to-day activities relating to UK ports. To illustrate, a senior 
port manager in the UK during the period could realistically find themselves acting as 
their port’s PFSO, being responsible for the writing and delivery of a programme of 
security training for staff, organising regular port security drills in liaison with private 
security personnel, attending regular port security committee meetings, helping to 
manage new biometric identification systems, even engaging with local community 
groups in a counter-terrorism project designed to secure harbours and coastline 
around their port. In short, counter-terrorism considerations would shape an 
increasingly large part of that individual’s working life and in a variety of different 
ways. 
  
There was also a spatial dimension to this increasingly expansive scope. EU 
‘Directive 2005/65/EC’ (European Union 2005) on enhancing port security for 
example ensured that an ISPS-style regime was introduced to the entire port. This 
spatial dimension would be a trend witnessed further as attention steadily focused on 
securing smaller harbours and even the coastline as a whole. Indeed with UK 
government schemes such as e-Borders and the associated focus on exporting the UK 
border, efforts to extend the zone of security further still were very evident. This 
spatial dimension is captured in the following figure, whilst also showing the layered 















The expanding circles represent the way in which the space that was deemed to 
require securing in relation to UK ports, harbours and coastline collectively, 
expanded. The arrows illustrate the general direction of travel in this case study 
specifically as focus was initially placed on securing the port/ship interface through 
the ISPS Code. For members of the policy network the objective was to push the 
presented threat further away from the UK’s maritime domain thus making it more 
difficult for it to be attacked or exploited by terrorists. What is evident in the new 











1 – Ship/Port Interface 
2 – Port 
3 – Coastline 
4 – Beyond territorial 
borders. 
to this process as an increase in security in one area was understood to increase the 
threat elsewhere. This dynamic in turn demanded that the space secured be further 
expanded and so forth. 
  
Ultimately the central thread running through the counter-terrorism security response 
was the pursuit, particularly by the British state and port owners, for greater 
knowledge about, and through this control over, activities associated with UK ports. 
For the state this took place through institutions such as DfT staff and SB ports 
officers, while for port owners it was through senior management teams and their 
work. An investment in material capabilities such as new fencing and information 
technology systems coupled with the growth in the number of individuals with some 
responsibilities for, and awareness of security, provided the means through which 
behaviour within UK ports was more effectively managed, with movement 
determined by physical boundaries and desirable behaviour emphasised through a 
cohort of ‘enlightened’ individuals.xxviii[28] The pursuit of enhanced port security did 

















                                                          
 
 
ii Italics added by author for emphasis. There is a genealogy to the IMO highlighting the threat to the 
maritime industry from terrorism as seen in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985. It 
resulted in the ‘Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation’ (SUA) being adopted in 1988. It set out the appropriate action which should be undertaken 
in the event of unlawful acts taking place against ships, including hijacking. More specifically it 
required, amongst other things, for contracting governments to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders. 
ii In this article a ‘port’ is understood to be a location at which facilities are in place for a vessel to be 
loaded and unloaded. A port then is understood to be generally larger than a ‘harbour’, a place at which 
generally smaller vessels may dock and/or be stored. There are both artificial and natural harbours. 
ii The definition of maritime domain utilised in this article is taken from the UK’s National Maritime 
Security Strategy (United Kingdom 2014, 54): “All areas and things of, under,  to, or bordering on a 
sea or ocean including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, ships and other 
conveyances”. 
ii The three strategies are all available online and are listed in the article’s bibliography. 
ii For example, in his address to the nation on 11 September 2001 President George W. Bush presented 
the terrorist attacks as an attack “on our fellow citizens” and “on our way of life, our very freedom”, 
immediately projecting outwards their significance (CNN.com US, 2001).  A few days later UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair would say in the House of Commons: “These attacks were not just attacks upon 
people and buildings; nor even merely upon the United States of America; these were attacks on the 
basic democratic values in which we all believe so passionately and on the civilised world. [...] But one 
thing should be very clear. By their acts, these terrorists and those behind them have made themselves 
the enemies of the entire civilised world” (Blair, 2001). At the October 2001 UK Labour Party 
Conference, the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw would comment, “there are some who wish completely 
to destroy our values and our way of life” (Guardian Online, 2 October 2001). 
ii Rita Taureck notes in, ‘Securitisation Theory – The Story so far: Theoretical inheritance and what it 
means to be a post-structural realist’, (unpublished paper presented at the 4th annual CEEISA 
convention, University of Tartu, 25-27th June 2006), that the theory has its roots in language theory. In 
particular, this performative function was originally set out in Austin, J.L. (1962) How to do things 
with words (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 110, note 2.  
ii This is a point advanced in Buzan and Waever, 2009, 266 when they note “the exploitation by China, 
Russia and Israel of the alibi of fighting terror for agendas quite unrelated to the American one”. 
ii This kind of analysis on responses to international terrorism can be seen in Silberstein, S. (2004) War 
of Words: language, politics and 9/11 (London: Routledge) and Jackson, R. (2005) Writing the war on 
terrorism: language, politics, and counter-terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press). More 
generally in relation to US foreign policy it is undertaken by Campbell, D. (1998) Writing Security. 
ii Richard Jackson includes a copy of a number of speeches from the Bush administration in the 
appendix to Jackson, R. (2005) Writing the war on terrorism. 
ii The idea of securitisations being institutionalised is also discussed on page 28 in Buzan, B., Waever, 
O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  An examination of how the 
discourse has been reproduced by the media and other institutions in society, further institutionalising 
it, can be found in Schechter, D. (2003) Media Wars: News at a Time of Terror (Oxford: Rowland & 
Littlefield); Lewis, J. (2005) Language Wars: The role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and 
Political Violence (London: Pluto Press) and Croft, S. (2006) Culture, Crisis and America’s War on 
Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
ii The common reference to ‘9/11’ rather than ‘11/9’ even in countries where this represents a reversal 
of the normal structure of dates, is testament to the power of this specific act of memorialisation. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ii The phrase ‘site of securitisation’ has also been utilised in Arne Davidsen, P. (2006) ‘The Making and 
Unmaking of the Politics of Exceptionality: Studying Processes of Securitisation and Desecuritisation 
in the Orange and Okavango River Basins’ (Master’s Dissertation, University of Bergen, 2006) and 
Copper Luiss-Cersdu, D. (2009) ‘Gender Conflict Society and Human Rights: SHUR Findings’, 4-6 
June. (Presentation at SHUR Final Conference, Rome).  
ii For example International Maritime Organization (2004b) ‘Press Release: ISPS Code Status Update 
01’, 11 June 2004.  
ii The ship-port interface is defined as “the interactions that occur when a ship is directly and 
immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or the provisions of port 
services to or from the ship” (IMO 2003, 113). 
ii During 2006 and 2007 there was disagreement in the United States (US) over whether all containers 
bound for the US should be scanned prior to their departure. One prominent supporter of 100% 
scanning was Democratic Congressman Jerrold Nadler who, in a press release in April 2006, lambasted 
the Bush administration on the issue commenting, “it’s common knowledge that Al Qaeda wants to 
sneak a nuclear weapon into this country – yet this Administration has been content to let 95 percent of 
the shipping containers we receive go uninspected” (Office of Congressman Jerrold Nadler 2006). 
Ultimately a compromise was reached with the passing of the Security and Accountability for Every 
(SAFE) Port Act, which encapsulated the concept of 100% scanning but sought to limit it to a selection 
of ports on a trial basis (Act available online: see bibliography). 
ii An initial report highlighting possible delays was Justin Stares: (Lloyd’s List 2008, 3). The European 
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be mandatory. See European Commission (2009) ‘Commission Regulation (EC) No 273/2009 laying 
down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the 
Community Customs Code, derogating from certain provisions of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2454/93’, Official Journal of the European Union, 2 April.  
ii The reference to US inspectors related to the presence of some US customs officials within European 
ports as part of the US Container Security Initiative (CSI).  
ii The fact that the Department for Transport set specific conditions to port operators in terms of height 
of fences and use of CCTV is noted in a Memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom Major Ports 
Group to a House of Commons report on transport security. See: House of Commons Transport 
Committee (2008) Transport Security: Travelling without Fear (Oral and Written Evidence). 
ii Further information about the RHIDES system can be found at the website: http://www.rhides.com/.  
ii Italics added by author for emphasis. 
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late with transposing Community rules’, Infrasite.net. 
ii The NCPP was an office funded by the Home Office through the Association of Chief Police Officers 
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in 2003 from co-ordinating Special Branch activity in UK ports to include the ACPO(Ports) portfolio 
that encapsulated those protective services in ports provided by uniformed officers. 
ii Image 1 – ‘Security Level Sign’, taken by author on site visit. 
ii Image 2 – ‘Port Security Poster’, taken by author on site visit. Contact phone number removed by 
author for the purposes of anonymity.  
ii Designed by author. 
ii Designed by author. 
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